Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 101
Issue 3 Symposium: Preventative Detention

Article 8

Summer 2011

Policing the Ratings Agencies: The Case for
Stronger Criminal Disincentives in the Credit
Rating Market
David A. Maas

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
David A. Maas, Policing the Ratings Agencies: The Case for Stronger Criminal Disincentives in the Credit Rating Market, 101 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1005 (2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol101/iss3/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/11/10103-1005
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2011 by Northwestern University School of Law

Vol. 101, No. 3
Printed in U.S.A.

COMMENTS
POLICING THE RATINGS AGENCIES: THE
CASE FOR STRONGER CRIMINAL
DISINCENTIVES IN THE CREDIT RATING
MARKET
David A. Maas *
“It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”
—Standard & Poor’s analyst

1

The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate how criminal disincentives
affect the credit ratings agencies. The Comment explores how the criminal
law influenced the behavior of the ratings agencies before and during the
subprime collapse and the credit crisis. The failures of the ratings agencies
have led to a widespread push for regulatory reform, but the possibility of a
targeted criminal law has been largely absent from the scholarly and
political discourse. This Comment examines why there have been no
criminal prosecutions against actors at the ratings agencies, particularly in
light of their heavily criticized role in the credit crisis. In finding criminal
liability difficult to establish under the existing law, this Comment suggests
that a tailored criminal law targeting the ratings agencies would provide a
justifiable and powerful control mechanism for high-risk misconduct.
Although strict civil laws could similarly deter misconduct, compliance with
and enforcement of civil regulations would be inefficient and expensive.
*

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Pomona College, 2006. I
would like to thank my parents for instilling in me a love of learning, and my wife for her
endless wisdom and immeasurable support.
1
In a now-infamous email exchange between two Standard & Poor’s analysts, one
wrote, “It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.” Another replied, “Let’s hope
we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters.” See Andrew Taylor,
Credit Raters Get Grilled on Capitol Hill, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE
(Oct. 22, 2008, 3:10 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/
2008296967_apmeltdowncreditagencies.html.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When two Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed in July 2007, it quickly
became clear that investment products tied to subprime mortgage loans
were overvalued. 2 What little was left of the once-booming business of
structuring complex securities and collateralized debt obligations came to a
screeching halt. The market for these investment products dried up and
investors watched as the ratings agencies finally slashed credit ratings. 3
Unfortunately, for most it was already too late to withdraw. Investors
suffered crippling losses on supposedly safe investment products that bore
the stamps of ratings-agency approval. How could this have happened?
Weren’t the ratings agencies supposed to prevent just this kind of marketwide valuation crisis? What were these gatekeepers doing with nonpublic
information if not protecting the investing public? The ratings agencies
became the target of scholarly, political, and mass-media censure. 4 Critics
began to reevaluate the role of the ratings agencies and how the regulatory
framework in which they operate did not adequately control misconduct.
Despite this widespread and often scathing criticism of the credit
ratings agencies (CRAs) 5 for their role in the subprime and credit crises,
there have been no criminal prosecutions for CRA misconduct.6 The
ratings agencies have taken a major blow in the court of public opinion,7

2

See Paul Tharp, Bad News Bear—Funds Now Worthless, N.Y. POST, July 18, 2007, at
35. It was not just high-risk hedge-funds imperiled by the subprime collapse; even moneymarket funds were invested in subprime debt. See David Evans, Money Markets Face New
Threat—Subprime Crisis Could Hit Them, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at A36.
3
Dow Dips, but NASDAQ Stages a Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at C13 (noting that
“Standard & Poor’s cut the ratings on 1,713 classes of securities backed by mortgages issued
in the first six months of [2007]”).
4
See generally The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007); Editorial, AAA Oligopoly, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26,
2008, at A18.
5
In referring to the CRAs, this Comment limits its scope to the three major players. The
ratings industry “is dominated by three agencies—Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors
Service, and Fitch Ratings.” David Teather, SEC Seeks Rating Sector Clean-Up, GUARDIAN,
Jan.
28,
2003,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/
jan/28/usnews.internationalnews.
6
See, e.g., Michael Hirsh, Drop Moody’s Into the Volcano: Why Wall Street’s Big
Ratings Agencies Should Go the Way of Arthur Andersen After Enron, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30,
2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/216486.
7
See, e.g., Barbara Kiviat, The SEC’s Next Challenge: Fixing the Rating Agencies, TIME,
Apr. 15, 2009, at 24 (noting confidently that “[a]ny list of people and institutions to blame
for the financial crisis would include credit-rating agencies”).
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and investor confidence in their ratings has plummeted. 8 Civil litigation
against the CRAs has marched forward: individual investors have sued the
CRAs in lawsuits for negligence, fraud, and deceit; 9 class actions have
named the CRAs as co-defendants; 10 and the federal government has sued
the CRAs for civil violations. 11 The failures of the ratings agencies
precipitated a push for regulatory reform, 12 but the possibility of reshaping
or strengthening the criminal disincentives that control the ratings agencies
has not been under serious consideration. 13 The integrity of our markets is
so dependent on the good faith of the CRAs that their wrongdoing, which
we might elsewhere address with civil liability, should face stricter criminal
disincentives. The absence of any criminal prosecutions, let alone
convictions, under the existing law should signal to Congress that the
existing criminal law is not providing a sufficient check on the ratings
agencies.
Not only the CRAs but the entire financial sector faced public and
academic scrutiny for the credit crisis. The investing public was furious at
Wall Street when the economy began to cave in; many wanted heads on the
chopping block. 14 Many top executives seemed to be in a vulnerable
8

See Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Triple-A Ratings Grade on a Curve, Making It
Difficult to Assess Risk, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2007, at B1 (“[I]nvestors across the globe have
lost confidence in the ratings.”).
9
One enraged former attorney, Ron Grassi, returned to practice and “set up a war room
in his Tahoe City, California, home to single-handedly take on Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s
Investors Service and Fitch Ratings.”
See David Evans & Caroline Salas,
Flawed Credit Ratings Agencies Reap Profits as Regulators Fail Investors,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 29, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601101&sid=a6NdKd8CfR2A.
10
See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Subprime Investors Sue Rating Agency, D & O DIARY, June
8,
2008,
available
at
http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/06/articles/subprimelitigation/subprime-investors-sue-rating-agency (describing a class action against the CRAs
alleging failure “to conduct due diligence and willingly assign[ing] the highest ratings to
such impaired instruments since they received substantial fees from the issuer”).
11
See Nathan Koppel & Chad Bray, Judge Limits Credit Firms’ 1st-Amendment
Defense—Ruling in Cheyne Finance Case Lifts Protection for Ratings Not Made Public;
Moody’s, McGraw-Hill Stocks Fall, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2009, at C3 (describing a
development in a class action including King County, Washington, as a plaintiff).
12
See, e.g., AAA Oligopoly, supra note 4, at A18 (discussing the need for reform in a
regulatory system that functionally only allows three credit ratings agencies to operate).
13
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Murphy, Concept Release on the Possible Rescission of Rule
436(g) Under the Securities Act of 1933, FED. REG., Vol. 74, No. 198, 53114–21, Oct. 15,
2009 (discussing the possibility of eliminating the CRAs’ exemption from Sections 7 and 11
of the Securities Act of 1933 but making no mention of criminal liability).
14
See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Being Kept in the Dark on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2007, at C1 (“Every financial disaster deserves a scapegoat, because someone must be
blamed when bad investments are made. . . . If the agencies violated their own policies, they
will be vilified for the conflicts of interest inherent in their being paid by the issuers of the

1008

DAVID A. MAAS

[Vol. 101

position, widely despised for their complicity. From an outsider’s
perspective, it looked like criminal prosecutions might bring some catharsis
to the investors who suffered catastrophic losses. But as the crisis wore on
and court dockets filled up with complex civil cases seeking damages, the
high-stakes white-collar criminal cases that many anticipated did not
materialize. 15 At first glance, potential white-collar criminal cases looked
promising. There were substantial harms caused by decisions and actions
of high-level market players: the only hurdle for prosecutors was proving
the requisite mens rea of knowledge or intent. 16 And yet only a handful of
cases went forward. 17
This Comment argues that misconduct at the ratings agencies should
be subject to criminal punishment even absent a mens rea of knowledge or
intent. 18 When the entire investing public bears a risk of catastrophic losses
for misconduct at the ratings agencies, there should be a strict criminal code
controlling that conduct. The integrity of the markets depends on accurate
credit ratings provided in good faith. With the stakes so high, criminal
sanctions are justified both as deterrents and as desert for the wrongdoers.
Traditional theories of punishment generally fall into two categories:
From a utilitarian
(1)°utilitarianism and (2) retributive justice.19
perspective, the financial crisis was a perfect opportunity to exact
punishments that deter future misconduct. There were market players who
needed stronger deterrence at all levels of the market, from mortgage
brokers all the way up to CEOs of bulge-bracket banks.
The case for retributive justice is perhaps even stronger with so many
millions of people suffering harm from the misconduct: not only did

securities. If they did not, they will be derided as fools who could not see how risky the
securities clearly were. In hindsight, of course.”).
15
See Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory Investigations
and the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 227 (2009)
(“Despite the number of credit crisis-related investigations that law enforcement agencies
have opened over the last two years, there have been remarkably few major regulatory
actions or prosecutions to date.”).
16
Admittedly, the expense of pursuing a complex white-collar criminal case is another
factor that plays some role in the decision to bring suit. See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 235
(“A number of significant obstacles, including the time and resources necessary to
investigate and uncover wrongdoing, as well as the difficulty in apportioning blame and
proving intent to defraud, confront successful law enforcement actions.”).
17
See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., 2 Face Fraud Charges in Bear Stearns Debacle, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2008, at Al (describing the criminal case against two hedge fund managers
at Bear Stearns who were catapulted into the spotlight in July 2007 when their hedge funds
collapsed).
18
See infra subpart III.B (recommending a mens rea of recklessness).
19
See generally SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES § 2 (8th
ed. 2007).
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investors around the world suffer huge losses, but also the job market
constricted, foreclosures skyrocketed, and citizens across the country
became collaterally damaged. 20 The scene was set for a series of heated
trials to captivate the public consciousness and restore some faith in the rule
of law. But as of yet, no high-profile criminal cases have made it onto the
dockets.
This Comment examines why there have been no prosecutions against
individuals at the ratings agencies. The ratings agencies have a long and
storied history in the American markets that dates back more than a
century. 21 Part II of this Comment will explain how the CRAs operate,
paying particular attention to their role leading up to the subprime and
credit crises. This section will also describe how flaws in the CRA model
led to their complicity in the crisis and will briefly outline some of the
suggestions that scholars and politicians have offered to fix the ratings
agencies.
Part III argues that the existing criminal law is not adequately deterring
misconduct by CRAs. Subpart III.A will analyze criminal liability under
the existing law. This section will focus on the difficulty of establishing
mens rea and the causation component of criminal liability. The progress
of civil suits against the ratings agencies indicates that a prosecutor could
prove the actus reus 22 elements of a crime. The case for causation is
slightly more difficult because there were so many factors at play in the
decline and fall of the subprime and credit markets. However, the most
significant barrier to a criminal conviction is the existing mens rea
requirement of knowledge or intent. 23
After exploring the theories of criminality, subpart III.B will propose a
stronger set of criminal disincentives. This section will recommend that
Congress enact a narrowly tailored federal criminal law targeted at the
ratings industry. This Comment argues that such a law would be both more
efficient and effective than a purely civil regulatory regime, and justifiable

20
See Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—Some Thoughts on a “Sustainable” and
“Organic” Regulatory System, 4 FL. INT’L U. L. REV. 381, 381–82 (2009) (describing the
crisis’s aftermath, including soaring unemployment, the devastation of retirement savings,
and the cascading effects in the real estate market).
21
See Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, 19 FED. RES. BANK
N.Y. Q. REV., 1, 1–4 (1994).
22
Black’s Law Dictionary defines actus reus as the “[t]he wrongful deed that comprises
the physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to
establish criminal liability.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 39 (8th ed. 2004).
23
See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 243 (noting that in potential criminal cases “attributing
blame and proving intent to defraud will present significant impediments to law
enforcement”).
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under traditional theories of criminal punishment.24 Although a more
stringent civil regulatory system could deter misconduct by the CRAs,
compliance with civil regulations would drive up systematic costs. Strict
civil regulations are expensive and not necessarily effective. 25 Moreover,
criminal punishment of wrongdoing in the ratings industry is justifiable in
light of the high stakes. CRA actors can currently hide behind the
sophistication of the rating process to defend against a criminal charge that
requires knowledge or intent. Thus, I propose a criminal law prohibiting
misconduct at the CRAs that requires only a mens rea of recklessness.
II. BACKGROUND
The subprime market collapse had immediate consequences on the
financial sector. High-powered Wall Street executives were shown the
door 26 and subprime lending shops were shut down. 27 Scholars, journalists,
and politicians collectively tried to explain how the walls came tumbling
The causes identified include (1) high-risk, experimental
down. 28
structured finance, including complex instruments such as collateralized
debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities, (2) the iron fist of markto-market accounting, and (3) recklessly loose lending standards. 29 In the
search for villains, most scholars and critics agree that the storm would not

24

See infra subpart III.C (discussing how utilitarian and retributive theories of
punishment both support criminalization of CRA misconduct at a lower threshold than the
existing law requires).
25
See, e.g., Diarmuid A. Hurley & David Boyd, Sarbanes Oxley Act Section 404:
Effective Internal Controls or Overriding Internal Controls?, 16.2 FORENSIC EXAMINER 19
(2007) (finding that Sarbanes-Oxley’s Section 404, “which was intended to create greater
accountability of top management . . . . morphed into a detailed, cost-prohibitive, and
ineffective [regulation system]”).
26
See, e.g., Robin Sidel, Monica Langley, & David Enrich, Two Weeks that Shook the
Titans of Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2007, at A1 (describing the “dual dramas at
Citigroup and Merrill [Lynch & Co.]” that saw Stanley O’Neal and Charles Prince, two
powerful Wall Street figures, forced out the door in the push for accountability).
27
See Worth Civils & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout: Lenders that Have Closed
Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
28
See, e.g., PAUL MUOLO & MATTHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET
CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS (2008); Charles W. Calomiris & Peter J.
Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,
2008, at A1; Alan Greenspan, Editorial, The Roots of the Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Dec.
12, 2007, at A1.
29
See generally MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 28 (describing the complicated and often
interconnected set of factors that led to the subprime collapse and the credit crisis).
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have been nearly so fierce were it not for the failures of the credit ratings
agencies. 30
A. THE AMERICAN CREDIT RATINGS AGENCIES: THE DEBT MARKET’S
TRIUMVIRATE

This Comment provides an abridged version of the interesting history
of the CRAs and the circumstances that resulted in our current credit ratings
system. 31 The ratings agencies’ primary role in the credit markets is to
provide information about the creditworthiness of securities and other debt
instruments that are bought and sold. 32 The credit ratings industry has been
dominated by three players—Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors
Service, and Fitch Ratings—and until recently, they were the “only three
with an official stamp of approval from the SEC, designated as nationally
recognised statistical-rating organisations, or NRSROs.” 33 These agencies
are supposed to serve a crucial function to investors—that of gatekeepers—
a function in which they wholly failed leading up to the financial crisis. 34
For any given corporation or security, the CRAs use information,
including “the issuer’s quality of assets, its existing liabilities, its borrowing
and repayment history and its overall business performance,” to generate a

30

See, e.g., Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, Credit Ratings Failures: Causes and Policy
Options, in MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: KEY ISSUES FOR THE
G20, 129, 129 (2009), available at http://www.voxeu.org/reports/G20_ebook.pdf (“As the
ongoing financial turmoil originated in the market for subprime mortgage-backed securities,
much attention is currently directed at the flaws of the securitization process and particularly
at the failures of the rating agencies (CRAs), which played a key role in this process. . . .”);
FRANK PARTNOY, OVERDEPENDENCE ON CREDIT RATINGS WAS A PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE
CRISIS 1 (2009) (presented at Eleventh Annual International Banking Conference) (“A
primary cause of the recent credit market turmoil was overdependence on credit ratings and
credit ratings agencies. Without such overdependence, the complex financial instruments,
particularly collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and structured investment vehicles
(SIVs), which were at the center of the crisis could not, and would not, have
been created or sold.”), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/
Partnoy_Overdependence_Credit.pdf.
31
For a more in-depth account of the ratings agencies, consider Frank Partnoy’s many
works on the ratings industry. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial
Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Ratings Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 619,
704—10 (1999) [hereinafter Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert]; Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit
Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other Gate-Keepers, FIN. GATEKEEPERS 59, 64–68 (Yasuyuki
Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006).
32
See In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
33
Teather, supra note 5. This Comment uses the term “NRSRO” to refer to the limited
group of credit ratings agencies that qualify for the title.
34
See Paul J. Davies et al., Reputations to Restore; Rating Agencies Come Under Ever
Closer Scrutiny, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 22, 2008, at 11.
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credit rating. 35 These ratings provide investors a barometer to evaluate the
risk and probability of repayment of a security. 36 Investors are free to
perform their own due diligence on most of the information available to the
CRAs; however, the ratings agencies have access to some nonpublic
information that gives them a distinct advantage. 37 The CRAs have carved
out a space in the market as specialized intermediaries, assessing risk based
on both public and nonpublic information.38
The agencies take in specific information and process it according to
specific protocols; 39 this assembly-line feature of the ratings industry
provides a solid shield against criminal liability. The analysts and
executives can blame their own failures on the mechanics of their riskmodels, and the standardized process offers a promising method of
defeating the mens rea requirement.40 But the agencies and their actors are
not robotic creditworthiness machines; the ratings process is not purely a
mechanical process in which XYZ input yields AAA output. There are
humans at the wheel.
Standard & Poor’s stipulates in its own materials that it will only give
a credit rating “when there is adequate information available to form a
credible opinion and only after applicable quantitative, qualitative, and legal
analyses are performed.” 41 The courts have recognized that agencies “are
expected to look beyond the financial reports in assessing an issuer.”42 This
35

Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, How Did Increased Competition Affect Credit Ratings?
11 (Harvard Business School, Working Paper 09-051, Sept. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-051.pdf.
36
Id.
37
See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole,
and Fear Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1500 (1998) (noting that “the only
reason that rating agencies are able to charge fees at all is because the public has enough
confidence in the integrity of these ratings to find them of value in evaluating the riskiness of
investments”).
38
Becker & Melbourn, supra note 35, at 11–12.
39
For example, before making a ratings decision, “S&P requires the following financial
information from management [of an issuer], if possible: five years of audited financial
statements; interim financial statements; operation and product descriptions; and draft
registrations statements.
In addition, non-public information may be presented
confidentially to the rating agencies to help them arrive at an appropriate rating.” In re
HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 637–38 (N.D. Ala. 2009).
40
See infra subpart III.A.
41
STANDARD
&
POOR’S,
STANDARD
&
POOR’S
CORPORATE
RATING
CRITERIA 9 (2006), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/
corporateratings_052007.pdf.
42
In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. at 637–38 (citing Cammer v. Bloom,
711 F. Supp. 1264 (D. N.J. 1989)) (relying on credit ratings in addition to the Cammer
factors to evaluate the efficiency of the market for a security and determine on balance the
viability of a class action claim under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act and Sections
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Comment argues that the fundamentally qualitative aspects of the ratings
industry justify criminal liability when a ratings agency recklessly
manipulates the qualitative inputs.43
B. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND OTHER ISSUES WITH THE RATINGS
AGENCY MODEL

The credit ratings industry has taken substantial criticism as a system
rife with perverse incentives and conflicts of interest. 44 The ratings
agencies clearly failed leading up to the subprime collapse; as a result,
scholars have scrutinized the CRAs’ role in the market. 45 Professor John C.
Coffee of Columbia Law School provided a useful, non-exhaustive list of
the major issues afflicting the ratings industry to the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 46 He identified five central
problems: (1) the issuer-pays model, (2) the NRSROs’ immunities from
liability, (3) the licensing power of the NRSROs, (4) the oligopoly of only
three ratings agencies, and (5) the weak incentive to update ratings.47 Each
of these issues raises doubts about the legitimacy of the current ratings
system; considered together, they suggest that the industry needs complete
reregulation and restructuring. 48
A central concern that critics have with the existing system is the
issuer-pays model. 49 Credit ratings agencies are paid by the issuers of

10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act). The court’s use of credit ratings here demonstrates an
institutional dependence on the ratings agencies so deep-rooted that the judiciary builds the
ratings agencies into its factor-analysis of efficiency.
43
S&P sets out some of the subjective criteria that go into a rating: “a thorough review of
business fundamentals, including industry prospects for growth and vulnerability to
technological change, labor unrest, or regulatory actions.” STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note
41, at 9.
44
See, e.g., Arthur Levitt Jr., Conflicts and the Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
2007, at A15; Serena Ng & Aaron Lucchetti, Congress Takes on Credit Ratings—ExMoody’s Analyst Says Inflated Ratings Continue, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2009, at C1,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125366267173132295.html.
45
See, e.g., Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Ratings
Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227 (2009).
46
Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 70-72 (2008) (statement
of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia
Univ. Sch. of Law), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg50399/pdf/
CHRG-110shrg50399.pdf [hereinafter Coffee Testimony].
47
Id. at 70–72.
48
Partnoy, supra note 31, at 704.
49
E.g., Levitt Jr., supra note 44, at A15 (“[C]redit ratings agencies—such as Moody’s
Investor Service, S&P, and Fitch Ratings—are playing both coach and referee in the debt
game. They rate companies and issuers that pay them for that service. And, in the case of
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securities—an arrangement that immediately seems backwards because
investors, not issuers, consume the ratings. The CRAs did not always
structure their operations as pay-for-services; they used to generate revenue
from subscriptions. 50 But in the 1970s, investor confidence plummeted in
response to the unexpected bankruptcy of the Penn Central railroad; the
issuers needed to assure investors that their debt instruments were still safe,
low-risk assets, and issuers were willing to pay for those assurances. 51 The
ratings agencies responded by abandoning John Moody’s legacy of
subscription service. 52 And thus began the issuer-pays model that has the
“watchdog paid by the persons they are to watch.” 53 Empirical research
suggests that the fees charged to issuers amount to upwards of 90% of the
CRAs’ revenue. 54 Moreover, the CRAs are exacerbating this conflict of
interest by offering pre-issuing consulting services to the issuers on top of
the traditional rating services.55 These consulting services are essentially
trial runs that allow issuers to experiment and exploit the ratings models
behind closed doors. 56 It also leaves the system vulnerable to criminal
conspiracy; without transparency, actors at both an issuer and a ratings
agency can cooperate to create an inflated rating—or even just an
investment-grade rating—that generates revenue for both the issuer and the
ratings agency. 57
The next major issue is limited competition: the ratings industry is
controlled by a triumvirate. Although the official group of NRSROs is no
longer confined to the triumvirate, those three have solidified a position of
superiority in the market. Even though federal regulations allow other

structured financial instruments which make it possible to securitize all those subprime
mortgages, they help issuers construct these products to obtain the highest possible rating.”).
50
See Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2006, 109 Cong. 2d Sess., Rpt. 109546, 8 (2006) (“Originally the major rating agencies only received revenue from selling lists
of their ratings to investors . . . [but] with the introduction of the copying machine, these
ratings lists could be easily copied and disseminated; the agencies needed another source of
revenue.”).
51
See Lawrence J. White, The Credit Ratings Agencies: How Did We Get Here? Where
Should We Go? 8 (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Seminar Paper), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/seminardocs/091112crediratingagencies.pdf.
52
Id.
53
Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 2.
54
See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not at All Like Other
Gatekeepers 62 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. Of Law, Legal Studies Research Series, Research
Paper No. 07-46 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257.
55
See Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 72.
56
Id.
57
See Lynch, supra note 45, at 247 (“Issuers want high ratings, not necessarily accurate
ratings. The higher the securities rating, the less concern investors will have about payment
default, the greater the liquidity, and the lower the issuers’ cost of capital.”).
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ratings agencies to qualify as NRSROs, “[t]he federal government created
the rating cartel, and the U.S. is as dependent on it as everyone else.” 58 The
history of ratings-agency legislation and regulation has resulted in a system
that gives three agencies tremendous power. 59 From the standpoint of an
investor, it seems obvious that such tremendous power should come with
substantial accountability. A government-endorsed oligopoly should not be
able systematically to mislead the entire investing public without risking
criminal punishment.
The next issue raised by Professor Coffee—the CRAs’ immunity from
civil liability—has been at the heart of many proposals for regulatory
reform. 60 The ratings agencies enjoy statutory privileges that insulate them
from the kinds of investor lawsuits that regularly target issuers, banks, and
other market players.61 Furthermore, many courts continue to empower the
agencies with a broadly construed First Amendment defense that treats the
CRAs as publishers of constitutionally-protected opinions. 62 When issuers
58

See David Evans & Caroline Salas, Flawed Credit Ratings Agencies Reap Profits as
Regulators Fail Investors, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 29, 2009, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=a6NdKd8CfR2A.
59
Congress has had opportunities to reconsider the structure of the ratings market and
proactively open the market to competition. For whatever reason, these opportunities have
not done much to bust up the ratings triumvirate. One potential competitor has argued that
the political discourse itself is dominated by the existing powers. For example, in 2002,
when Congress addressed the ratings market after the Enron disaster, the Egan & Jones
agency lodged the following complaint:
We do not believe that investors’ interests are adequately represented in the composition of the
Hearings on Credit Ratings Agencies or that there will be any meaningful change in the nonindependent partner monopoly that is the root cause of the failure to warn investors. The
majority of the panel is comprised of the current NRSRO’s, large security firms, large issuers,
large investors (which are capable of doing their own research), associations representing large
security firms (the SIA and Bond Market Association) and issuers (the Association for Finance
Professionals) and large investors (the Investment Company Institute). One of the two
academics included is conflicted (Schwarcz’s research center is supported by S&P and the large
security firms).
Conspicuously absent are independent academics who are considered experts in the field such as
Larry White of NYU and Frank Partnoy of Washington University, consumer and investor
advocates such as the Consumer Federation of America, the Department of Justice and groups
that have been hurt by the WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing and other failures.

Letter from Sean J. Egan & W. Bruce Jones, Letter Re: Hearing on Credit Ratings Agencies
Egan-Jones Rating Company, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Nov. 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm.
60
See, e.g., Fact Sheet, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Strengthening Oversight of Credit
ratings agencies, Open Meeting of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Sept. 17, 2009,
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-200-factsheet.htm.
61
Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 71.
62
See Cnty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., Inc., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding
that ratings are covered by the First Amendment); see also Evans & Salas, supra note 58
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attempt to bring suit under a theory of defamation, the issuers “must show
that the rating agencies relied on falsehoods because of actual malice and
had actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of their
claims.” 63 The First Amendment has largely insulated the CRAs from civil
liability to issuers. The CRAs operate with remarkably little risk of liability
given how high the stakes of their actions can be. 64 “Put simply, if credit
ratings agencies do not have to fear liability to investors, they have less
incentive to be diligent or prudent.”65 Although there is a strong case for
expanded civil liability, the criminal provisions this Comment recommends
would provide a more effective solution without the risks of burdensome,
inefficient investor lawsuits. 66 The state, not investors, should police the
ratings agencies.
The next issue that Coffee identified—the CRAs’ regulatory licensing
function—focuses on how credit ratings have become mandatory for certain
actions by institutional investors. 67 From this perspective, the ratings
agencies “have thrived, profited, and become exceedingly powerful because
they have begun selling regulatory licenses, i.e., the right to be in
compliance with regulation.” 68 The issues raised by this regulatory
licensing view amplify some of the aforementioned problems. In particular,
from this perspective we can see the irrationalities and dangers of an issuer(“The U.S. District Court in Santa Ana, California, ruled that the county would have needed
to prove the rating company’s ‘knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth’ to
win damages.”).
63
Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach
for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1055 (2009) (“This First
Amendment hurdle has made it extraordinarily difficult to establish that rating agencies
engaged in libel and has left issuers without legal recourse except in outlier cases.”); see also
Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1688–92 (2008) (discussing how 2006
legislation failed to address the almost complete immunity that the CRAs enjoy from tort
liability).
64
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONGRESS, FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 82 (Comm. Print 2002), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/100702watchdogsreport.pdf (“SEC Rule 436, promulgated under the
Securities Act, expressly shields NRSROs from liability under Section 11 of the Securities
Act in connection with an offering of securities. This means that NRSROs are not held even
to a negligence standard of care for their work.”); Jonathan S. Sack & Stephen M. Juris,
Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past and Future, 233 N.Y. L. J. 88, Nov. 5, 2007 (“Despite
the concerns reflected in this new legislation, NRSROs are largely insulated from liability.
Notably, NRSROs are shielded from potential liability under § 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, which otherwise imposes strict civil liability on underwriters, accountants, and others
for materially false registration statements.”).
65
Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 71.
66
See infra subpart III.B.
67
Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 71.
68
See Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 31, at 711.
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pays model. 69 Civil penalties are not a sufficient disincentive against
falsified ratings. If the issuer-pays model is to have any coherence, there
needs to be a powerful set of disincentives that caution against
conspiratorial misconduct between issuers, institutional investors, and the
CRAs. This Comment suggests that a stronger criminal law would have the
capacity to increase stability if the issuer-pays model survives.
The last major problem is the lack of incentives to update ratings. 70
This issue feeds back into many of the others. For instance, it highlights the
flaws of an issuer-pays model: issuers obviously have no incentive to push
for an update when it will result in a downgrade; moreover, the CRAs do
not collect fees for updates so they have no financial incentive to be
diligent. 71 These issues compounded to create the flawed ratings system
that precipitated the credit crisis. As these issues are explored in the context
of regulatory reform, it is hard to envision a civil regulatory regime that can
adequately address the problems of the existing system. Criminal
provisions, unlike complex civil regulations, could provide an overarching
disincentive structure that addresses the issues without burdening the
system with the unpopular expense of civil regulatory compliance. 72
C. THE RISE OF COMPLEX STRUCTURED FINANCE AND THE RATINGS
AGENCIES’ FAILURE TO ADAPT

The previous two subparts have set out some of the structural
weaknesses of the credit ratings industry. This subpart describes how the
rapid growth of structured finance exploited and exposed those weaknesses,
ultimately contributing to the subprime and credit crises.73 The swift

69
When the issuers pay the ratings agencies and the issuers need certain ratings in order
to sell their debt instruments, the ratings agencies are put under intense pressure by the
issuers (their primary source of revenue) to provide the necessary rating. One interesting
aspect of the CRAs’ regulatory licensing function is that it runs counter to the theory that
ratings are merely published opinions constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.
If ratings were merely opinions, institutional investors would not give the ratings agencies a
licensing power.
70
Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 72.
71
Id.
72
See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 142–44, 152 (2006) (describing how issuers
will seek the system with the optimal amount of regulation and how Sarbanes-Oxley risks
driving out companies because of the inefficiently high costs of compliance).
73
It has been suggested that the very creation of these increasingly complex structured
finance products might be enough to establish liability under some theory of fraud. See R.
Christopher Whalen, Policy Brief, The Subprime Crisis—Cause, Effect, and Consequences 7
(Networks
Fin.
Inst.,
Working
Paper,
Mar.
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113888 (“CDOs and other types of OTC derivatives blossomed
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expansion of the markets for residential-mortgage-backed securities and
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) led to a debt market full of new
types of investment products with unknown risk-metrics. 74 Well before the
financial meltdown, Warren Buffett referred to these new structured finance
vehicles as “financial weapons of mass destruction.” 75 CDOs are securities
collateralized by a pool of asset-backed securities, for which the underlying
collateral is primarily subprime residential mortgage loans.76 Rating
complex securities and CDOs requires more sophisticated risk models; yet
the ratings agencies willingly rated these experimental, untested products as
quickly as the issuers could package them. 77 The issuers were dependent on
the ratings agencies because they needed a comprehensible risk-metric to
successfully market these new investment products to investors. 78
The details of the complex rating process for CDOs and asset-backed
securities are beyond the scope of this Comment. However, it is worth
noting the role of credit enhancements in the ratings process. 79 Credit
enhancements are cushions that supposedly prevent cataclysmic losses even
in the event of extraordinarily weak market conditions. 80 In determining
the required level of credit enhancements, the ratings agencies supposedly
assume “catastrophic losses on an order of magnitude of the Great
Depression.” 81 Credit enhancements are intended to function as a line of
defense against particularly rough market conditions. When the subprime
crisis hit, credit enhancements failed to serve this defensive role. Thus, the
CRAs’ failures cannot be explained away by extreme market conditions;
the constricted market simply exposed the inadequate disincentives
governing the ratings industry.

into hideously complex and opaque permutations, configurations that a smart trial lawyer
might successfully argue were deliberately deceptive.”).
74
See id. (“[T]he rapid acceleration of financial technology created classes of assets that
neither the Federal Reserve nor the other regulators ever anticipated—or understand even
today.”).
75
Buffett Warns on Investment ‘Time Bomb,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2003, 1:32 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2817995.stm.
76
See Merrill Lynch, Annual Report 2009 (Form 10-K), at 27.
77
See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2047 (2007).
78
See generally Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, How Did Increased Competition Affect
Credit Ratings? (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-051, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1278150##.
79
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 77, at 2047.
80
See id.
81
Id.
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D. EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: A FOCUS ON AMENDING THE
CIVIL REGULATORY SCHEME

In light of the ratings agencies’ failures, most scholars agree that the
“architecture of credit ratings agency regulation needs reform.” 82 The
proposals to date have focused on restructuring the civil regulatory
regime. 83 They address important deficiencies in the incentives that
currently control the ratings agencies including the conflicts of interest and
the problems of a three-player ratings industry. 84 Some of these proposals
could remedy many of the underlying issues with the ratings industry. By
exploring these promising but incomplete solutions through civil
reregulation, I hope to demonstrate how criminal provisions could fill some
of the gaps and provide a more functional regulatory framework.
The important focus in both critiques and proposals for reform of the
credit rating system is how the incentives operate. One theorist suggests
addressing the perverse incentives of a reputational capital model of ratings
agencies by replacing it with a profit-disgorgement model. 85 Briefly, the
reputational capital model “holds that a well-functioning reputation
mechanism will give ratings agencies optimum incentives for producing
high-quality ratings.” 86 Ratings agencies develop a reputation based on the
quality and accuracy of the ratings they produce; thus, they have an
incentive to bolster that reputation by producing good-quality ratings.87

82

Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional
Investor Perspective 7 (U. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 09-014, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430608.
83
Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(b) Under the Securities Act of
1933, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,114 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 220)
(“[W]e are now exploring whether Rule 436(g) is still appropriate in light of the growth and
development of the credit rating industry and investors’ use of credit ratings.”); see also
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Rules and Forms at Issue in Removal of
References to NRSRO Credit Ratings, (Sept. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-200-rulesformsaffected.htm.
84
See, e.g., Norris, supra note 14, at C1 (“One clear improvement to the current structure
of the debt markets would be to insist that all information shared with rating agencies be
shared with the whole market.”).
85
See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”:
The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109.
86
Id. at 113.
87
Id. (“The underlying idea is that if investors determine that a rating agency’s ratings
are of low quality, they will stop crediting the ratings, and the agency’s business will lose
value.”).
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But there are clearly problems with the reputational capital model. For
example, it is not obvious that investors are sensitive to reputation.88 In fall
2009, a Moody’s analyst revealed that his employer gave a complex debt
security a falsely inflated rating in January 2009, knowing full well that the
underlying assets would be downgraded; as he predicted, the securities were
put on review for downgrade shortly thereafter. 89 This occurred despite the
already tarnished reputation of the ratings agencies. If actors at the ratings
agencies are continuing to provide favorable ratings without serious
concern for inaccuracies and downgrades, then the reputational capital
model is not functioning as an adequate check on misconduct.
The profit-disgorgement model is an alternative whereby the CRAs
would have to give back the fees they received for a rating if the rating
turned out to be unreasonably inaccurate.90 Although this proposal has
some intellectual appeal, in practice it would almost certainly trigger
expensive and inefficient conflicts between the issuers and the ratings
agencies whenever things went awry. Litigation would arise over whether
fault was with the issuer or the ratings agency for inaccuracies, and whether
those inaccuracies were unreasonable. Adding systematic costs to the
transactions between the ratings agencies and the issuers is not a costeffective mechanism to protect investors.91
In September 2009, the SEC approved a series of proposals designed
to strengthen oversight of CRAs, “enhance disclosure and improve the
quality of credit ratings.” 92 These proposals included new and improved
disclosure requirements 93 and a more rigorous set of reporting requirements
to ensure compliance with the SEC regulations. 94
A preeminent scholar of the credit ratings industry, Frank Partnoy,
suggests that “Congress should create a new Credit Rating Agency
Oversight Board (CRAOB) with the power to regulate rating agency
practices, including disclosure, conflicts of interest, and rating
88
See Cantor, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that the reputational capital model is
entrenched but can only function properly if investors are able to rely on the high quality of
the CRAs’ ratings).
89
See, e.g., Ng & Lucchetti, supra note 44.
90
See Hunt, supra note 85, at 182–83.
91
But see id. at 194–95 (suggesting that the profits would be disgorged to investors,
ultimately restoring at least part of their losses). However, even if profits were disgorged to
investors, the system costs of ongoing monitoring and regular litigation would be much more
substantial than targeted criminal provisions that only resulted in the occasional high-profile
suit.
92
Fact Sheet, supra note 60.
93
For example, it proposed substantially more disclosures about conflicts of interest. See
id.
94
Id.
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methodologies, as well as the ability to coordinate the reduction of reliance
on ratings.” 95 Partnoy’s theory is that the SEC is not currently in a position
to provide the necessary oversight. However, he agrees that “Congress
could enhance the authority of the SEC to grant it similar power to oversee
the rating business.” 96 Back in 1999, Partnoy recommended that we replace
credit ratings with credit spreads. 97
Some go so far as to propose the elimination of all regulation of the
credit-rating industry. 98 The thrust of this free-market argument is that the
reputational capital model will self-regulate the ratings industry and the
government does not need to interfere with regulations. This radical theory
mounts an attack both on the special treatment of NRSROs and the
regulatory licensing function of the ratings agencies. 99 The proposal
theorizes that “[i]f a rating agency, unprotected by a government oligopoly,
issues lousy ratings, it’s going to lose business.” 100 Although this theory
might have some appeal, it would be dangerous and radical, raising issues
of system-wide deregulation well outside the scope of this Comment.
Many of these proposals for reform are persuasive, particularly those
directly addressing the conflicts of interest in the current system. However,
this Comment suggests that instead of a thorny web of civil regulations that
are expensive from both a compliance and enforcement perspective, a
narrowly tailored criminal law would deter the most problematic
misconduct, restore investor trust in the markets, and ensure a much higher
baseline standard of care. Before exploring that proposal, it is worth
discussing the inadequacies of the existing criminal law.
III. DISCUSSION
Prosecutors have not been completely blind to the possibility of
criminal suits against actors at the credit ratings agencies. 101 For example,
95

Partnoy, supra note 82, at 2.
Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 31, at 704–10.
97
See id. Credit spreads are best understood as the difference in yield between U.S.
federal government-issued debt securities and the subject private debt security. See id. at
704–09.
98
See, e.g., Michael Sisk, A ‘Radical’ Answer to Credit-Ratings Conflict, U.S. BANKER
July 2008, at 48, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/usb_issues/118_7/-3570081.html.
99
Id.
100
Id. (“The government should remove itself completely from the credit-rating business,
stop deciding which company can and can’t rate a bond, and stop making institutions pay
attention to rating agencies whose work may be shoddy.”).
101
See, e.g., Press Release, Connecticut Attorney General’s Office, Attorney General
Says His Broader Investigation into Credit Ratings Agencies Continuing Aggressively (June
5, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/AG/cwp/view.asp?A=2795&Q=416772 (“The
96

1022

DAVID A. MAAS

[Vol. 101

the California attorney general launched a broad investigation into the
ratings agencies. 102 The goal of that investigation was to determine the
CRAs’ “role in fueling the financial crisis” by exploring whether they:
• Failed to conduct adequate due diligence in the rating process;
• Gave high ratings to particular securities when they knew or had
reason to know that high ratings were not warranted;
• Failed to comply with their own codes of conduct in rating certain
securities;
• Profited from giving inaccurate ratings to particular securities;
• Made fraudulent representations concerning the quality or
independence of their ratings;
• Compromised their standards and safeguards for profits;
• Failed to use statistical models that captured the risk inherent in
subprime and other risky assets; or
• Conspired with the companies whose products they rated to the
detriment of investors. 103
These questions set out a frame for possible criminal cases and provide
a solid set of issues to consider in drafting a criminal statute targeting the
ratings industry. 104 Former California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown
is one of a handful with prosecutorial power who has explored the
possibility of criminal suits. This hesitation to pursue criminal charges
suggests that those with prosecutorial power do not think criminal
convictions are likely. 105 Moreover, the driving force of the recent wave of
litigation against the CRAs has been monetary recovery and not
punishment. 106 There are a number of theories of criminal liability that a
rating industry is highly concentrated, with three private, for-profit companies effectively
controlling large swaths of our credit markets. As I recently urged Congress and the SEC,
this fatally flawed system must be fixed. I proposed several specific reforms—reasonable,
relatively simple steps that will go a long way toward making credit ratings more accurate
and trustworthy. My investigation continues and may result in legal action.”).
102
Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Brown
Launches Investigation into Credit Rating Agencies’ Role in Fueling Financial Crisis (Sept.
17, 2009), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1808.
103
Id.
104
See infra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
105
See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 263 (“Rather than focus on past wrongdoing . . . [law
enforcement agencies have] pushed for significant changes in the business practices of credit
rating agencies, again avoiding the proof problems involved in proving criminal
wrongdoing.”). The dearth of lawsuits could also, however, suggest that those with
prosecutorial power are simply exercising prosecutorial discretion in consideration of the
time and expense required for these complex cases.
106
See, e.g., Liz Rappaport & Nathan Becker, Ohio Files Suit Against Credit Raters,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2009, at B3 (describing a suit against the ratings agencies seeking
recovery for massive losses to public pension funds).
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prosecutor might consider under the existing law, but this Comment argues
that these cases are weak at best, evincing the need for a targeted criminal
law with some teeth to it.
A. CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER EXISTING LAW

A criminal prosecution against a CRA actor would be difficult on at
least two major fronts: (1) causation and (2) mens rea. Prosecutors could
try to bring a wire fraud case, a case for fraudulent violation of SEC
regulations, or a more general criminal fraud case at the state level. In all
cases, the theory of causation would be attenuated unless incriminating
information came to the surface that conclusively correlated the ratings to
investor decisions. The mens rea requirement would be the highest hurdle
for fraud charges requiring knowledge or intent. The mens rea in a
hypothetical prosecution against a CRA actor would be shrouded by (a) the
complexity of these investment products and (b) market-wide risk-metric
failures.
1. Causation
With civil suits moving forward against the CRAs, one might expect
there to be a solid case for causation in the criminal context.107 However,
the causation issues in a criminal case against an individual actor would be
different because a prosecutor would have to connect the individual
defendants’ actions to the harm. In the civil suits, the plaintiffs can target a
ratings agency broadly and can triumph on securities fraud claims without
establishing any misconduct by specific actors at the ratings agencies.
However, a generalized causation argument that might succeed in a civil
suit would not suffice for a criminal prosecution against an individual.108 It
would be difficult to prove that an individual actor at the CRAs took any
action that in itself rose to the level of criminal fraud.
2. Mens Rea
The mens rea requirement would be a formidable hurdle under the
existing law and probably explains the absence of any prosecutions.109

107

See, e.g., In Re Moody’s Sec. Litig., 599 F.Supp.2d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
See Henderson v. Kibble, 431 U.S. 145, 151 (1977) (holding that “the Constitution
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime,”
including causation).
109
See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 228 (setting out the difficulty of establishing a mens
rea as part of the reason for so few criminal cases in the subprime crisis).
108
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Proving mens rea is a difficult task that is at the heart of the criminal law. 110
The difficulties of establishing mens rea are particularly burdensome in
complicated fraud cases like those that would arise in the credit ratings
market. 111 There are no obvious facts from which to establish mens rea in
the ratings industry. Without initiating an investigation, there is nothing
that CRA actors do or produce that would indicate knowledge or intent.
One commentator explains:
The assessments of accountants like Arthur Andersen can be tested. If an accountant
doesn’t follow GAAP, or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, his negligence
can be checked, and he can be cast out of the profession—or prosecuted. By contrast,
ratings agencies, despite carrying the government’s imprimatur, each have their own
unique methods of rating. There is no standardized approach as there is in the
accounting industry. “They are masters of their own methodologies. You have to
112
prove their own methodologies are wrong. . . .”

The ratings agency analysts and executives can defend a criminal
charge by professing reliance on their ratings models. They can say that at
worst they realized in hindsight that the models were inaccurate. There is
nothing in the actions of a CRA analyst or executive in rating a debt
instrument that would help establish mens rea, aside from any outright
admission of knowledge or intent.
3. Theories of Liability
A theory of liability in a potential case against a CRA actor would fall
under the umbrella of fraud. 113 A criminal prosecutor could try to develop
the following general theory, varying somewhat by jurisdiction or based on
the particular federal statute: criminal liability exists when (1) a ratings
agency defendant (2) intended to defraud (3) by knowingly distributing
false information, (4) expecting investors to rely on that false information,
(5) which investors did rely on, (6) resulting in a loss to those investors. 114
110
E.g., Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75,
81 (1908) (“It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law, for which no authorities need
be cited, that the doer of a criminal act shall not be punished unless he has a criminal
mind.”).
111
Cf. Ceresney, supra note 15, at 228 (“Even in situations where there was wrongdoing,
the time and resources required to mount investigations and the burden of proving intent to
defraud are formidable obstacles for prosecutors and regulators to surmount, except in the
most straightforward of fraud cases.”).
112
Michael Hirsh, Drop Moody’s into the Volcano, NEWSWEEK, (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.newsweek.com/id/216486 (quoting a former Moody’s managing director).
113
“Fraud” does not delineate a specific federal crime, but rather is a concept underlying
a genus of crimes. See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 731–34
(1999).
114
This general construction does not derive from a particular statute or common law
rule, but a synthesis of elements in various statutes. Cf. id. at 749–60.
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The most difficult piece to prove in this general theory would be intent. A
prosecutor would have to convince a jury not only that a defendant was
recklessly endangering investors but also possessed an intent to defraud.
What charging offenses are available to prosecute fraud in these kinds
of high-stakes cases? One specific statutory theory of fraud that
prosecutors might advance would be wire fraud. The four elements of
criminal wire fraud are the following: (1) the defendant voluntarily and
intentionally devised or participated in a scheme to defraud another out of
money, (2) the defendant did so with the intent to defraud, (3) it was
reasonably foreseeable that interstate wire communications would be used,
and (4) interstate wire communications were in fact used.115 Here, like in
the general theory, a prosecutor would need to demonstrate an intent to
defraud. That high mens rea requirement protects the ratings agencies from
federal prosecutors.
The closest thing to a targeted statutory criminal charge under the
existing law would flow from the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006 (CRA Reform Act). 116 Although there is no criminal charge explicitly
defined in the statute, it sets the groundwork for potential criminal or
criminal conspiracy charges against the CRAs. The statute charges the SEC
with regulating the ratings agencies, imposing specific requirements with
respect to the conflicts of interest inherent in the ratings industry. 117
The SEC has promulgated regulations, including SEC Rule 17g-5,
which requires ratings agencies “to disclose and manage conflicts of interest
that arise in the normal course of engaging in the business of issuing credit
ratings.” 118 This regulation opens the door to charges of criminal
conspiracy, as explained in one report:
[I]f the government can prove that some sort of tacit agreement existed between the
investment banker and the credit ratings agency in which the banker would bring his
deals to the rating agency in return for a good rating, the government is likely to argue

115

See United States v. Proffit, 49 F.3d 404, 406 (8th Cir. 1995). Sometimes courts
parse the cause of action into a different number of elements but these different constructions
all amount to the same general requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d
745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (parsing wire fraud into two essential elements: (1) a scheme to
defraud, and (2) the use of, or causing the use of, interstate wire communications to execute
the scheme); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1993) (setting out the
wire fraud elements as (1) a scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, (2) defendant’s
knowing and willful participation in the scheme with intent to defraud, and (3) use of
interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme).
116
Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)).
117
Id.
118
Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Final Rules to Implement the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006, May 23, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2007/2007-104.htm.
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that it not only constitutes a conflict of interest but should be considered a criminal
conspiracy.
To prove a criminal conspiracy, the government need only prove the existence of an
illegal act and an agreement to perform. This is arguably easier to prove than an
aiding-and-abetting violation, which requires proof of both knowledge and substantial
assistance, thus potentially exposing both the rating agencies and investment banks to
119
additional criminal charges.

In order to successfully bring a case under SEC Rule 17g-5, a prosecutor
would have to prove that the CRA actor intentionally conspired to withhold
disclosure of conflicts of interest. Some CRA agency executives have
publicly admitted that conflicts at their agencies caused inaccuracies in the
ratings: “Conflicts of interest were largely responsible for the disastrous
performance of credit ratings agencies in assessing the risks of mortgagebacked securities, two former high-ranking officials at Moody’s Investors
Service and Standard & Poor’s said . . . in Congressional testimony.” 120
This admission would seem to bode well for a criminal case against
the ratings agency executives. Unfortunately, the admission is not as
substantial as it seems at first blush. The CRA executives have only
admitted in hindsight that they realize how the conflicts of interest caused
ratings agency failures. In order to establish the mens rea for criminal
conspiracy, a prosecutor would need to show that the defendants had the
mens rea at the time the alleged CRA misconduct occurred.
What about those analysts who sent what looked like smoking-gun
emails back and forth about the ratings agency system being a wellconstructed house of cards? 121 Standing alone, those emails seem to impute
a mens rea of at least knowledge with respect to the ratings agencies’ false
disclosures. What is stopping these emails from at least getting a criminal
case before a jury? The attenuated causal connection between the emails
and the harm makes the case against these analysts weak at best. The CRA
Reform Act does not place a positive duty on all ratings agency actors to
disclose their knowledge of conflicts of interest.122 There is no Good
Samaritan law that imposes criminal sanctions for failing to report the
misconduct of others. Thus, unless the analysts intended to act in
furtherance of a fraud crime, they cannot be held liable for complicity or
119

WILLIAM R. “BILLY” MARTIN, ET AL., THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS: SOMEBODY
HAS TO PAY 4 (2009), available at http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/
8d710730-7bb5-4ee0-88d0-84d1bed596fe/Presentation/NewsAttachment/2eaf4704-0967459e-a838-40219a20068f/Reprint_Martin.pdf.
120
Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Ratings Agency Heads Grilled by Lawmakers, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at B1.
121
See Taylor, supra note 1.
122
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006) (placing no affirmative duty on the CRAs).
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conspiracy. Prosecutors seem to have no solid case against any actor at the
ratings agencies, despite institutional knowledge that false and misleading
ratings were placing unjustifiable risks on investors. The absence of a
viable criminal case fails to capture the magnitude of harm caused by the
CRAs and the central importance of credit ratings to investors.
4. Mistake of Fact Defense and Other Hurdles
Another hurdle that a prosecutor faces is a mistake of fact defense. 123
Mistake of fact allows a defendant to defeat a charge if he honestly believed
in a set of facts that would prevent him from forming the requisite mens rea
required to constitute the crime. 124 An agency analyst would be able to
argue that he honestly believed the ratings models were functional or that
the ratings were reasonably accurate, which would defeat the requisite mens
rea of knowledge or intent required for a fraud crime under the existing
law. The CRAs could also argue that they were ignorant of undisclosed,
material information from the issuers.125
Another issue is willful blindness. The ratings agencies can probably
survive a criminal prosecution even if there is a showing of willful
blindness. Unlike public companies, the CRAs are immune from the
disclosure requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 126 SOX
put in place a much stronger set of criminal disincentives for corporate
executives; 127 however, those laws do not cover the ratings agencies.128
By no means is this an exhaustive review of the theories of liability,
strategies, or defenses that would arise in a criminal case against a CRA
defendant; however, the foregoing analysis will likely apply similarly to
other charges. 129 More importantly, these issues demonstrate the substantial
difficulty that prosecutors face in bringing criminal suits.

123

Mistake of fact is a longstanding doctrine that allows defendants to defeat liability by
arguing subjective misapprehension of a material fact. See generally Keedy, supra note 110,
at 81–88.
124
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1985).
125
See Keedy, supra note 110, at 81 (“One who commits a criminal act under mistake of
fact has a defense, because he has wrong or insufficient data for reasoning.”).
126
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
127
Michael D. Silberfarb, Justifying Punishment for White-Collar Crime: A Utilitarian
and Retributive Analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 95, 98 (2004).
128
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. VII (expanding white-collar criminal law and
increasing sentences, but targeting corporate actors without including CRA actors).
129
For instance, there could be charges of intentional misstatements or omissions, which
can constitute federal criminal violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). The mens rea
required for a conviction under this statute is still intent.
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B. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A NARROWLY TAILORED CRIMINAL LAW
ADDRESSING THE ISSUES AFFLICTING THE RATING INDUSTRY

Congress should consider enacting new criminal provisions controlling
the ratings agencies. There will undoubtedly be substantial opposition from
the CRAs themselves and probably some issuers who have been colluding
with the agencies. But Congress should find support from securitizers,
investors, regulators, and the public. The packagers of investment products
will be able to market their products more vigorously based on their ratings,
which will be substantially more meaningful if the CRAs face significant
criminal disincentives. Moreover, the risk of investor lawsuits will
decrease if issuers, trustees, and investment managers can point to the
ratings as a more reliable measure of risk. Investors will benefit in two
ways from criminal regulation of the CRAs: (1) they will have more
confidence in the ratings because they know the stakes are higher for
analysts and executives at the CRAs and (2) they will have the opportunity
to push for retributive justice if future misconduct causes losses.
The criminal CRA provisions could be part of a freestanding criminal
statute or integrated with a civil regulatory statute like SOX. 130 The statute
could build off of the following proposed core provisions:
Title I—Credit Ratings Accountability
§ 1.01—Management Accountability
(1) All credit ratings provided by a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization must be approved by two personnel, including at least one
management-level individual.
(2) Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations must keep records
of which personnel certified each credit rating for a period not less than 10
years.
Title II—Criminal Credit Rating Fraud
§ 2.01 Criminal Credit Rating Fraud
Whoever recklessly certifies, or attempts to certify a falsely inflated or falsely
depressed credit rating to be published by a Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization shall be criminally fined or imprisoned not more than 15
131
years, or both.

These provisions provide a basic skeleton with two important features.
First, the requisite mens rea is expressly articulated as recklessness, which

130
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codifying both
civil and criminal provisions in various sections of 15 and 28 U.S.C.).
131
A growing literature focusing on proportionality of sentences highlights the
importance of legislative limits on sentences. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Punishment
Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005).
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will help solve the proof problem that prosecutors face.132 The lower
threshold of mens rea should incentivize more prosecutors to at least
investigate the ratings agencies. The second important feature is the dualcertification requirement; this requirement will force management at the
CRAs to take accountability for ratings along with analysts. It should
provide a disincentive to management-level misconduct that
counterbalances the existing conflicts of interest and financial incentives to
inflate ratings. 133 As a result, all published ratings will carry a signature,
comparable to an executive’s signature on an SEC filing. 134
This criminal law is narrowly tailored to exclusively cover NRSRO
actions, because the ratings agencies serve a unique role in the markets.
Congress should not lump the ratings agencies into the same statutory
regime as issuers, banks, trustees, investment companies, and other players
in the financial sector. The news media chose a narrative of the financial
crisis that demonized “Wall Street” as though there were a unified mob of
villains that walked the streets of Manhattan. A broad criminal statute
would not adequately address the issues unique to the ratings industry: the
ratings industry needs a narrow but robust set of criminal disincentives in
place.
The complete provisions should flesh out the proposed frame and set
out what types of quantitative and qualitative information a ratings agency
must consider before rating a debt instrument.
However, these
requirements should not serve as a closed set of inputs for credit ratings.
Overregulation would stifle innovation in both the ratings industry and the
financial sector, while undermining the functioning of a competitive ratings
market. The value of a credit rating continues to depend on the reputational
capital of the ratings agency that issued it. If a ratings agency’s risk-models
were effectively government-controlled, investors would not be able to
differentiate between the different ratings agencies. Furthermore, a fixed
132

Cf. Ceresney, supra note 15, at 252 (arguing that there is already enough evidence for
prosecutors to meet a knowledge or intent requirement).
133
Cf. Lynch, supra note 45, at 254 (“[A] recent SEC report concluded that although
analysts’ salaries at the three largest NRSROs were generally based on seniority and
experience, bonuses were based on individual performance and the overall success of the
firm. The more business a credit rating agency solicits, the more successful and profitable it
becomes.”) (citations omitted).
134
Courts have been resistant to imputing scienter from a signature. See In re Ceridian
Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the possibility that an
executive’s signature could be sufficient to establish scienter by asserting that “[a]llegations
that accounting errors were discovered months and years later do not give rise to a strong
inference that the certifications were knowingly false when made”). However, this
Comment proposes a mens rea of recklessness for CRA criminality, which is lower than
scienter. The signature would at least be strong evidence of the required mental state when
taken in conjunction with gross inaccuracy of a credit rating.
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set of inputs might not be able to capture the risks of new debt instruments,
like the structured investment vehicles and CDOs that were at the heart of
the subprime and credit crises.
Instead, the provisions should provide a baseline or core set of
requirements from which analysts can construct risk-models within the
statutory framework. The proposed criminal offense will specifically target
and control these risk analytics. The ratings agencies should be held to a
standard of conduct that represents their paramount importance in
disseminating widely consumed evaluative information.
These criminal provisions will provide systematic legitimacy to the
ratings industry, which in turn will bolster the whole financial sector. The
implementation and enforcement of strict criminal sanctions for misconduct
at the CRAs will restore investor trust. Investor confidence is crucial to
economic recovery and market stability going forward. 135 Furthermore, as
the financial sector begins to regain its footing, it will begin to innovate
again, which could reintroduce the risks of untested new investment
products. In order for this innovation to succeed, investors will need to rely
on the ratings agencies to perform their role as gatekeepers.136 These
proposed criminal provisions would help stimulate economic growth by
promoting investor confidence. Although a strict new civil regulatory
framework could provide some of the same deterrent value, compliance and
enforcement would be expensive and burdensome. Criminal disincentives
provide powerful disincentives for wrongdoing without the expense of
regulatory compliance.
C. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNISHMENT

Under the existing law, a criminal conviction would be an expensive
long shot. Neither the foregoing theoretical analysis 137 nor the empirical
evidence (the absence of any successful prosecutions) 138 supports bringing
135
See Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Reregulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2009) (“Trust acts as a lubricant and reduces the
transaction costs associated with economic conduct; its presence makes economic activity
more efficient and permits actors to focus on wealth generation rather than wealth
preservation.”).
136
See Lynch, supra note 45, at 304 (“In a world of increasing complexity and opacity,
investors may find it increasingly difficult to engage in their own risk assessments, and, even
if they could do so, for all of them to do so would be increasingly inefficient. Rather,
investors may continue to rely on rating agencies, financial analysts, and other informational
proxies to provide reliable information about the risks and values of securities. . . .”).
137
See supra subpart III.A.
138
See, e.g., Ceresney, supra note 15, at 263–67 (noting that state securities regulators
have focused on prospective civil reregulation but avoided pursuing criminal cases for past
abuses).
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criminal charges against actors at the ratings agencies. But does that mean
criminal liability should not be imposed? Is the criminal law too forgiving?
Or did the misconduct at the ratings agencies simply not rise to the level of
criminality? Answering these questions requires an exploration of the
normative theories of punishment. Most justifications for punishment fall
into one of two camps: retribution and utilitarianism. 139 Both of those
theories support criminal punishment of misconduct at the ratings agencies.
But is criminal punishment of ratings agency misconduct the best
solution for the credit markets? Some scholars, particularly optimal penalty
theorists, 140 would probably contest the value of incarceration for this kind
of wrongdoing. 141 However, given the tremendous risks associated with
ratings agencies’ actions and the heated public outcry at their failures,
incarceration would at the very least provide some cathartic value above
and beyond monetary fines or civil compensatory and punitive damages.
1. Retributive Justice
The magnitude of harm that can result from wrongdoing at the ratings
agencies should make criminal punishment a just desert for wrongdoers.
Retribution is a theory of punishment that appeals to “the idea that
punishment is directed at imposing merited harm upon the criminal for his
wrong.” 142 Under a retributive theory of punishment, putting a ratings
agency actor on trial and imposing criminal punishment should only happen
if that punishment, in and of itself, is warranted. 143 One of the many
frustrations of the financial crisis has been a lack of accountability. From
this standpoint, punishing the ratings agencies for misconduct that caused
catastrophic losses seems to fill the void. The markets themselves have not
139

See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03[A] (3d ed.

2001).
140

Optimal penalty theory was introduced by Gary Becker and postulates that the
criminal law should seek to deter illegal behavior in the most efficient way. See Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207–09
(1968).
141
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1980) (advocating for fines instead of imprisonment in many whitecollar cases); Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L. J. 2017, 2019–20 (1992).
142
Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2000); see
also Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 120 (2008) (“Retribution justifies
punishment because it is deserved due to wrongful conduct.”).
143
See Lord Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
66 (Ronald M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (discussing how retribution is justified as an embodiment
of the public perception of moral accountability).
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inflicted damage on the CRAs: “Despite warnings from industry Jeremiahs
and calls for change from Washington, Wall Street is betting the ratings
services will avoid the radical reforms their most ardent critics are urging.
The industry, the thinking goes, will remain much as it was before:
protected, profitable and, detractors say, rife with conflicts.” 144
If the ratings agencies continue to profit without suffering any public
penalties, there will remain a wound in the public consciousness, one that
might heal if the ratings agencies are punished.
After Enron and other massive corporate scandals of the early 2000s,
the government pushed for sweeping regulatory reform. Although the
CRAs were investigated, they “were a low priority after the banks,
accountancy firms and officers of the companies where fraud [had] been
uncovered.” 145 This time, the ratings agencies cannot hide behind Kenneth
Lay or Charles Keating.
2. Specific Deterrence
If any individual actor in the credit ratings market spent time in jail,
the threat of further punishment would promote honest behavior and
specifically deter future fraud. Specific deterrence is a utilitarian theory of
punishment grounded in preventing repeat offenses by the same
individual. 146 Targeted criminal provisions would deter future misconduct
by the CRA actors who played a role in the current crisis. A federal
criminal statute would vastly reduce the risk of CRA actors engaging in the
same kind of questionably fraudulent activity that precipitated or at least
amplified the credit crisis. The threat of jail time is a powerful disincentive
to all individuals, including the affluent, because it deprives citizens of their
liberties. 147 Undoubtedly, actors at the ratings agencies would quickly
become aware of new criminal provisions, and it would not take a
discerning eye to determine the intent of those provisions. Thus, the
enactment of a criminal statute governing the ratings agencies would
provide specific deterrence almost immediately.
Congress could incorporate language into the statute that makes it
clear the new laws are intended to deter the kind of misconduct that
precipitated the credit crisis. Courts almost always interpret statutory laws
144

David Gillin, In Rating Agencies, Investors Still Trust, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at

B1.
145

Teather, supra note 5.
See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1997).
147
See, e.g., Ernest Van Den Haag, The Criminal Law as a Threat System, 73 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 769, 770–72 (1982) (addressing social scientists’ challenges to the theory
that punishment deters future misconduct by declaring that “the deterrent effectiveness of
threats per se can hardly be questioned”).
146
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as only prospectively applicable. 148 Moreover, the Constitution prohibits ex
post facto laws—laws that criminalize conduct prior to the enactment of the
law. 149 Thus, a federal criminal law would not open the floodgates for
prosecutors to go after past misconduct. However, if Congress articulated
its intent to specifically proscribe the kind of conduct that the CRAs
engaged in during the credit crisis, the statute would effectively put the
CRAs on notice. The ratings agencies would need to adapt their practices
and procedures to avoid criminal liability.
3. General Deterrence
There should be stricter criminal provisions in the credit ratings market
because the threat of criminal sanctions is a powerful deterrent to whitecollar actors. 150 General deterrence is a utilitarian theory that hypothesizes
that punishment prevents future crimes on a system-wide basis. 151 Criminal
punishment sends a clear message: our society will not tolerate a specific
kind of misconduct. 152 The power of that message provides a justification
for punishment as general deterrence.153 General deterrence is particularly
potent in high-profile criminal cases. As one journalist put it: “[H]ighprofile prosecution deters white-collar crime. White-collar criminals have a
much larger stake in society and are therefore tractable. They see ex-Tyco

148
Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719,
1736 (2006) (“Because retroactivity is disfavored in the law, statutes will be construed to
apply prospectively unless Congress has specifically said otherwise.”) (citation omitted).
149
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”).
150
Although some argue criminal fines are

perhaps the most efficient and effective means of deterring corporate crime and expressing
society’s condemnation . . . Congress must supplement these fines with other forms of
punishment [or else] potential offenders will view the fines as a mere tax. . . . [I]n order to
contribute to a change in corporate culture, the punishment must indicate society’s condemnation
and a mere tax would not perform this function.

Silberfarb, supra note 127, at 102–03 (citations omitted).
151
See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 949, 949–51 (1966); see also John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One
Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1336 (2009)
(“[One] school of thought argues that the purpose of punishment is deterrence, which
involves inflicting an evil on a wrongdoer to discourage others from committing similar
wrongful acts.”).
152
See Andenaes, supra note 151, at 950.
153
See DRESSLER, supra note 139, at § 2.03[B] (noting that from the perspective of
general deterrence the goal is “to convince the general community to forego criminal
conduct in the future”). In regulating the credit ratings market, this goal is slightly narrower:
to convince the community of actors involved in the ratings process—issuers, CRAs, et al.—
to forego wrongdoing in the future. Cf. id.
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CEO Dennis Kozlowski rotting away in Sing Sing, and they don’t want to
be like him.” 154
In theory, there has been a trend towards tougher sentencing guidelines
and less lenient criminal punishment of white-collar criminals. 155 In many
areas of white-collar crime, the number of federal suits has dropped
substantially in recent years, which might indicate that the more draconian
sentencing guidelines are successfully deterring white-collar crime. 156 It
could also indicate that (1) white-collar criminals have adapted their
misconduct to evade criminal violations, (2) prosecutors have intentionally
or arbitrarily decided to bring fewer white-collar cases, or (3) despite the
harsh sentencing guidelines, the substantive law is too soft on white-collar
crime.
In the case of the ratings agencies, the second possibility is unlikely
because prosecutors have actively investigated the CRAs. 157 Both the first
and the third possibilities suggest that Congress should seriously consider
restructuring the substantive criminal law governing the ratings agencies.
The ratings agencies could very well have adapted their behavior to exploit
the weak criminal law. Regardless of whether the CRAs have knowingly
circumvented the law, the law itself is far too soft. The ratings agencies
wield huge amounts of power in credit markets—if anything, the law
should be overly protective of investors.
Creating a clear set of criminal provisions targeted at the CRAs will
strengthen the entire market for debt products and deter misconduct
throughout the financial sector. If actors at the ratings agencies are wary of
the risks of criminal liability, they will project that awareness when
interacting with issuers, investors, and others in the market. This infectious
vigilance will foster a heightened respect for the looming fist of the law and
promote rigorous compliance. Although the risk of civil liability can also
generally deter misconduct, the possibility of losing one’s liberty provides
an incentive on an entirely different order of magnitude.
154

Jesse Eisinger, Making Sense of the Credit Debacle, SLATE MAG. (Mar. 3, 2009 11:36
AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2212480/entry/2212685/.
155
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 21–25 (1988) (noting the
penalty increases for white-collar offenders).
156
The number of federal criminal suits for securities and exchange fraud in 2008 was
actually 35% lower than the number in 2005. See David Z. Seide & Brian M. White, Don’t
Give Agencies Criminal Power—Consolidating Criminal and Civil Authority Is an Extreme
Departure and Is Bound to Create More Problems, NAT’L L.J., (June 8, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431252200&slreturn=
1&hbxlogin=1 (“There were only 66 federal criminal cases brought for securities and
exchange fraud in 2008, down from 101 cases in 2005.”).
157
See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 101.
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4. The Trend Toward Stricter White-Collar Criminal Law
When the Enron scandal came to light in 2001, it catalyzed a
movement to clean up corporate behavior that led to a number of systematic
changes. 158 One of those changes was an increase in prison sentences for
The United States Sentencing Commission
white-collar crimes. 159
overhauled the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, targeting white-collar
crime. 160 The sentences for fraud-related white-collar crimes increased
substantially both on paper and in practice.161 This development was
embraced by the investing public as a recognition “that white collar crimes
pose a threat to the country’s social and economic fabric as significant as
that of organized crime and narcotics trafficking.”162
The Enron debacle justified a stricter and harsher criminal law
controlling the boardrooms of public companies.163 Similarly, the credit
crisis justifies a more exacting and forceful criminal law controlling the
ratings agencies. Congress has already attempted to reregulate the civil
liability system in the credit ratings industry to no avail. 164 The credit crisis
showcased investors’ vulnerabilities. As investment products become
increasingly sophisticated, investors become increasingly reliant on the

158

John Kroger describes six major positive developments triggered by the Enron
disaster: (1) increased prison sentences for white-collar crime, (2) formation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, (3) a new bar on auditing companies providing
consulting services, (4) stricter rules governing Special Purpose Entities, (5) efforts to reduce
conflicts of interests, and (6) more resources for the SEC. See John R. Kroger, Enron,
Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57,
114–19 (2005).
159
See Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms:
An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 7 (2001) (describing how the revised
Federal Sentencing Guidelines post-Enron increased penalties for many white-collar crimes).
160
See Kroger, supra note 158, at 115.
161
Id. at 115 n.272.
162
Id. at 115.
163
Although SOX has been subject to critical commentary, most of the criticism focuses
on the expensive and complicated civil regulations. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Does the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 239–51 (2009) (discussing the
pushback caused by the vast and sometimes crippling expense of SOX compliance). This
Comment is not suggesting a complex civil regulatory framework for the CRAs; on the
contrary, this Comment suggests tailored criminal provisions could provide more powerful
disincentives than a complicated set of civil regulations.
164
See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 265 (“Despite [post-Enron] reforms, similar criticism
of ratings agencies has emerged during the current credit crisis, which superheated in July
2007, when the largest agencies announced plans to downgrade hundreds of bonds backed
by subprime residential mortgages. . . . The ratings downgrades spooked an already nervous
market, as investors fled stocks and low-quality bonds.”).
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ratings agencies to analyze credit risk. 165 When those ratings proved
hollow promises of stability, investors rightfully expressed discontent at the
state of the credit ratings system. 166 The stakes are too high to allow the
ratings agencies to operate without a powerful disincentive scheme. Civil
liability has proved an inadequate disincentive. The most effective
disincentive scheme would include targeted criminal provisions that (1)
deter wrongdoing and (2) justifiably punish high-risk misconduct.
5. Overcriminalization Concerns Should Not Affect Regulation of WhiteCollar Crime
The overarching goal of this Comment is to recommend a targeted
expansion of the federal criminal law that deters misconduct at the ratings
agencies. This Comment would be remiss not to address a body of
scholarly literature in recent years describing a perceived problem:
overcriminalization.167 This Comment admittedly encourages Congress to
consider an increase in criminalization in the ratings market. However,
overcriminalization concerns should not carry the day, given how centrally
important credit ratings are to the integrity of the financial markets.
The persuasive force of overcriminalization arguments is much weaker
Concerns about prison
in the context of white-collar crime. 168
overcrowding and racially distorted criminal conviction data are not present
in the white-collar arena. 169 Although some might consider violent crimes
165

See Cantor, supra note 21, at 4 (highlighting the importance of integrity in the credit
ratings market because of investor reliance on the high quality of the CRAs’ ratings).
166
Ceresney, supra note 15, at 265 (“Investors complained bitterly that delinquencies in
residential mortgages had been rising for months prior to the ratings downgrades, and that
S&P and Moody’s were too slow in correcting the excessively high ratings that had been
placed on many classes of bonds backed by subprime mortgages during the housing
boom.”).
167
See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of
Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005).
168
See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 780 (2005) (stating that
overcriminalization is much less likely to occur in the white-collar context because there is
much less white-collar enforcement).
169
In an article analyzing the anti-criminalization movement, Darryl Brown notes the
following:
There is a wide scholarly consensus that American incarceration rates are excessive and racially
skewed and that sentencing policies are overly rigid. Expansion of substantive criminal law
deserves little blame for this. The dramatic growth in incarceration rates is mostly of a function
of new sentencing laws rather than new crimes, coupled with greater enforcement of mostly
long-standing, familiar crimes, not outdated ones with little popular support.

Darryl K. Brown, Rethinking Overcriminalization 51 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper
No. 995, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/995.
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categorically more troublesome, white-collar crime can wreak widespread
economic havoc on the American public in a way that an individual street
crime cannot. 170 White-collar criminal provisions provide a check on the
powerful monetary incentives that can motivate white-collar crime. The
existence of powerful criminal disincentives in the financial sector shields
the American public from the corruptive forces of greed and the
catastrophic losses that can result from wrongdoing. The ratings agencies
provide a prime example of how misconduct in a white-collar setting can
lead to cascading and devastating harms.
The traditional
overcriminalization arguments do not substantially caution against
increasing criminal liability in this arena.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress should seriously consider restructuring the criminal law
controlling the CRAs. In the past decade, the ratings agencies have played
a major part in two waves of massive investor losses: the accounting frauds
of the early 2000s, and the subprime and credit crises. The stakes have
been exceptionally high, and yet the CRAs and all of their underlying actors
have escaped without defending a single criminal prosecution. The ratings
agencies continue to enjoy immunities and privileges despite their
complicity in the worst financial meltdown since the Great Depression.
Congress needs to address this lack of accountability and safeguard
investors from further abuse.
In the scholarly discourse surrounding mass incarceration, many
liberal academics are demanding that policymakers and politicians rethink
the penal system. At the same time as this movement for more
humanitarian social justice on the streets, there has been a push for more
stringent and unforgiving punishment of high-stakes white-collar crime.
Despite the concerted advocacy for more corporate and white-collar
accountability, the criminal law has not succeeded in disincentivizing
egregious corporate misconduct. A clear example of the criminal law’s
failure is the absence of criminal prosecutions for misconduct by the CRAs.
From the standpoints of both retributive justice and deterrence, the state
170

See Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should
Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77, 78 (2010). Meeks makes the case that:
Corporate and white-collar crimes generate significant costs to the American public. These
crimes not only result in direct monetary losses for innocents—such as employees of
corporations who lose significant value from their pension and retirement plans or even their
jobs—but they also discourage further investment in financial markets. Such a reduction of
capital can stifle an economy and result in job loss.

Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
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would be justified in criminally punishing this kind of misconduct.
However, the existing law fails to provide sufficiently strict criminal laws.
There are substantive hurdles in the criminal law that obstruct the just,
criminal punishment of misconduct at the CRAs. Under the existing law,
the ability to impose criminal sanctions on CRA actors who engage in highrisk misconduct is frustrated by a mens rea requirement of knowledge or
intent. CRA actors can hide behind a shield of complexity. The CRAs
should be held to a different standard that acknowledges the importance of
an honest, unconflicted market for ratings. A mens rea of recklessness will
put the CRAs on notice that rubber-stamp ratings will no longer fly under
the prosecutorial radar. Moreover, a statute criminalizing misconduct
underlying the credit crisis will restore investor trust by promising more
stringent punishment of wrongdoing.
The future of the credit ratings industry hangs in the balance.
Congress must decide how to address the inadequacies of the existing
regulatory framework. An expanded civil liability system that opens the
door to investor suits against the CRAs will only further clog the federal
courts. Civil regulations and the associated compliance and enforcement
would be unduly expensive and burdensome. On the other hand, a
narrowly tailored set of criminal provisions could provide a powerful
disincentive against misconduct at the CRAs without the expense of
regulatory compliance. The absence of a targeted federal criminal law
governing the ratings agencies was a get-out-of-jail-free card for the CRAs
in the credit crisis. But this is no game of Monopoly—Congress should
take those cards out of the deck.

